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Democracy promotion has been a mainstay in the toolbox of US foreign policy 
over the past 30 years.  The rationale for democracy promotion is largely designed to turn 
autocracies into democracies based on the belief that “Democracies create free markets 
that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners, and are far less 
likely to wage war on one another.”1  However, countries with only limited democratic 
processes are actually more prone intrastate and interstate violence.2  Therefore, pushing a 
country from autocracy to an autocracy with elections or a partial democracy may 
inadvertently cause a greater security problem.  In order to avoid the unplanned creation 
of such hybrid regimes, a greater understanding of the factors that affect levels of 
democracy is required.  
This paper is a quantitative exploration of the effect of structural factors upon the 
level of democracy.  While the interaction of key actors (e.g. civil society, the military, 
and the ruling executive) may be the final arbiters in determining a country’s level of 
democracy, the political preferences of those actors are influenced by structural factors. 
From the literature, the structural factors with the most explanatory power upon both 
democracy and actor preferences include security, economic development, and the 
diffusion of norms.  
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Democracy promotion has been a mainstay in the toolbox of US foreign policy 
over the past 30 years.  The rationale for democracy promotion is largely designed to turn 
autocracies into democracies based on the belief that “Democracies create free markets 
that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners, and are far less 
likely to wage war on one another.”3  However, countries with only limited democratic 
processes are actually more prone intrastate and interstate violence.4  Therefore, pushing 
a country from autocracy to an autocracy with elections or a partial democracy may 
inadvertently cause a greater security problem.  In order to avoid the unplanned creation 
of such hybrid regimes, a greater understanding of the factors that affect levels of 
democracy is required.  
This paper is a quantitative exploration of the effect of structural factors upon the 
level of democracy.  While the interaction of key actors (e.g. civil society, the military, 
and the ruling executive) may be the final arbiters in determining a country’s level of 
democracy, the political preferences of those actors are influenced by structural factors. 
From the literature, the structural factors with the most explanatory power upon both 
democracy and actor preferences include security, economic development, and the 
diffusion of norms.  
Although democracy is sometimes viewed as a decision-making process or a 
measure of egalitarian policies, this study views democracy as a measurement of the 
competitiveness, openness, and electoral constraints upon the selection and accountability 
of political leaders.  Many contemporary democracy theories were derived from the 
classical works of Aristotle and Tocqueville.  Both argued that a wealthy society was an 
important attribute of a functioning democracy since it provided a large number of 
citizens who “possess enough wealth to want order.”5  Tocqueville also argued the 
importance of democratic norms largely built through associations.6  Twentieth century 
works argued that these norms and associations were built through industrialization, 
3 President William J. Clinton, The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1996, p. 2.
4 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War," 
International Organization 56, no. 2 (2002); Håvard Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? 
Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992 " The American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 
(2001).
5 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Stephen D. Grant (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2000), 287.
6 Ibid., 128, 213.
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urbanization, and modernization.7  While these fundamental changes to the economic 
system are often referred to ambiguously as economic development, it is important to 
differentiate between economic factors such as income growth and industrialization. 
More recently, analysts argued that the diffusion of democratic norms came not through 
changes to the economic system but through increased travel, migration, and trade.8 
Security is often assumed to be a prerequisite that allows the development of norms, 
associations, wealth, and industry.  Without security, democratic norms and processes 
take a back seat to survival.9  
This paper seeks to build upon previous research by identifying the relative 
relationship between four key structural factors and the spectrum of polity types from 
fully autocratic to fully democratic.  While there is a wealth of econometric analysis on 
the economy-democracy link, there is a lack of econometric analysis using other 
structural factors such as security or the diffusion of norms.10  Those studies that do 
broaden the scope to other structural factors tend to focus on democracy as a 
dichotomous relationship.  The view of democracy through a dichotomous lens typically 
resulted in a nominal analytic approach in order to indentify thresholds for transition and 
7 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Ill.,: Free 
Press, 1958); Simon Smith Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread, Studies in 
Comparative Economics 7 (New Haven,: Yale University Press, 1966); Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some 
Social Requisites of Democracy," American Political Science Review (1959); Daron Acemoglu and James 
A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist  
Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
8 Steven  Levitsky and Lucan Way, "International Linkages and Democratization," Journal of Democracy 
16, no. 3 (2005): 22-3; Kristian Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, "Diffusion and the International Context 
of Democratization," International Organization 60(2006): 932-5; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, All  
International Politics Is Local : The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2002), 21-3; Harvey Starr and Christina  Lindborg, "Democratic Dominoes 
Revisited: The Hazards of Governmental Transitions, 1974-1996," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, 
no. 4 (2003): 510-5; Michael Colaresi and William Thompson, "The Economic Development-
Democratization Relationship: Does the Outside World Matter?," Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 4 
(2003): 394-7.
9 Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," 134-5; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation : Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, 6; Diamond, 
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, 16; ———, Developing Democracy : Toward Consolidation, 
89-90.
10 For econometric works on the economy-democracy link, see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and 
Development : Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990, Cambridge Studies in the 
Theory of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Abbas Pourgerami, "The Political 
Economy of Development: A Cross-National Causality Test of Development-Democracy-Growth 
Hypothesis," Public Choice 58, no. 2 (1988); David L. Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions " American  
Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 (2006).
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consolidation.  Because of the need to broach a defined threshold, these studies missed 
the ordinal effect of variables upon incremental changes in democracy.     
 To explore the relationship between the four structural factors and the level of 
democracy, this paper presents econometric and computational analysis using a large-N 
panel data design.11  The panel included annual data on 171 countries over 61 years for 
the period 1946-2006 (n = 171, t = 61).  The post World War II timeframe was used for 
analysis because it encompasses the majority of movement towards democracy in what 
many refer to as the second, third, and fourth waves of democracy.12  The panel dataset 
was used to test four hypotheses.  Combined, the four hypotheses state that, all else being 
equal, a change in the level of intrastate violence, industrialization, income, or regional 
democratic norms, may lead to a change in the level of democracy.   
This paper is organized into three parts.  The first section is a description of the 
variables (dependent, independent, and control) and data sources for both econometric 
and computational analysis.  The second section describes the methodology including the 
selection of the estimable model for econometric analysis and the computational 
approach.  In order to compensate for serial correlation, heteroskedascity, and an 
unbalanced panel, random effects linear regression with first order autoregressive 
disturbance was used as the estimable model.  The computational approach augmented 
the econometric analysis with historical trend data and insight into the value of 
independent variables during transition between regime types.  
Section three presents the results for the quantitative analysis. The quantitative 
results support the hypotheses that intrastate violence, industrialization, income, and 
diffusion had an effect on the level of democracy.  Intrastate violence had a strong 
negative effect on the level of democracy.  While violence has at times served as a means 
to achieve a democratic regime change (for example, the Romanian Revolution of 1989), 
violence is more frequently associated with breakdowns in democracy.  Similarly, a 
11 Panel data is a combination of time-series (in this case annual observations over a period of decades) and 
cross sectional (multiple observations per case in a single year) data.  Time series data provides insight into 
changes within countries while cross sectional data provides insight on differences between countries.
12 Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (1991); Michael 
McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the 
Postcommunist World," World Politics 54, no. 2 (2002).
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decrease in the level of violence is far more likely to result in an increase in the level of 
democracy than a decrease.  
The econometric results provided only limited support to the hypothesis that 
industrialization had an effect on the level of democracy.  No level of economic growth 
or development can force a country to increase its level of democracy.  Industrialization, 
and to a lesser extent income, had a polarizing effect upon polities.  Full autocracies and 
full democracies were generally wealthier and more industrialized than their partial 
regime brethren.  Income, and to a lesser extent industrialization, was positively 
associated with movement towards the polity extremes.  However, once a wealthy, 
industrialized country did substantially increase its level of democracy, it was more likely 
to obtain and sustain a high level of democracy.  Even so, the explanatory power of 
development waned over time to the point of obsolescence.  Perhaps part of the 
explanation lies in the fourth hypothesis.  As the explanatory effect of development 
waned, the influence of the diffusion of norms became stronger.  This suggests that the 
decreasing costs of transportation and information sharing provided an alternative 
mechanism for the development of associations and democratic norms making 
industrialization less of a requirement.
Data and Variables
The definition and data source of each of the eleven variables used in the 
quantitative analysis is covered in detail in this section.  The dependent variable, or the 
outcome, was the level of democracy.  There were four causal, or independent, variables: 
internal security, economic income, industrialization, and diffusion of norms.  In 
addition, six control variables were used: economic crisis, oil rents, colonial legacy, 
region, bureaucratic maturity, and the loss of an interstate war.
The Level of Democracy: the Dependent Variable
Democracy has always been somewhat difficult to quantify.  Throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, analysts used Schumpeter’s and Dahl’s definitions of democracy to 
create a dichotomous dependent variable.13  Attempts to define an adequate threshold 
13 In this case, the term autocracy is used collectively as some authors used alternative terms such as 
authoritarian, totalitarian, or dictatorships.  Likewise, some authors used the term polyarchy instead of 
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with which to bifurcate polities into neat groups of democracies and autocracies 
contained an intrinsic catch 22.  The difficulty resided in the decision of what to do with 
hybrid regimes such as Malaysia and Singapore; countries with limited democratic 
processes.  Classifying them as democracies would tarnish the image of other countries 
with stronger democratic practices.  Classifying them as autocracies equated their 
government systems to the likes of North Korea.  The binary classification of regime type 
is an inadequate approach that provides misleading results.
A broader sense of democracy came in the mid 1970s as efforts to quantify 
democracy began to blossom, resulting in the creation of four major empirical databases: 
Freedom House, Gasiorowski, Polity, and Vanhanen.  While both Freedom House and 
Polity provide data across significant time frames, Polity is the preferred metric for 
quantitative researchers such as Mansfield & Snyder, Hegre et al., and Epstein, et al.14 
The only major author that uses Freedom House is Diamond.  However, Diamond used 
the data for trend, not statistical, analysis.  Although there is no perfect database, Polity 
has a slight edge on Freedom House with regards to conceptual logic, internal reliability, 
measurement, and aggregation.15  
Although the polity score is an imperfect aggregation, it is the best alternative 
available.  The composite polity score is computed from three measurements: the fairness 
and freeness of elections; the openness of political participation to all groups regardless 
of differences such as ethnicity, religion, region, or income class; and the sanctity of the 
electoral process which prevents the executive from manipulating the constitution in 
order to perpetuate tenure.  Each of the three components is a key component to the 
study’s definition of democracy.  Therefore, this study used the polity2 score from Polity 
as the proxy for the level of democracy for each country at year t.
democracy.
14 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War," 
International Organization 56, no. 2 (2002); Håvard Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? 
Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992 " The American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 
(2001); David L. Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions " American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 
(2006).
15 Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating 
Alternative Indices," Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 1 (2002).
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Polity uses a 21-point scale (-10 to 10) polity score for countries with a population 
greater than 500,000 from 1800 to 2008.  For ease of interpreting the econometric results, 
the polity score was converted to a zero to 100 scale by adding ten to each polity2 score 
and then multiplying by five.  The polity2 metric is a modified version of polity made 
suitable for time-series analysis by modifying the polity score for regimes in transition, a 
period of interregnum (i.e. anarchy), or a period of interruption (e.g. by invasion). 
Following Plumper and Neumayer, scores for interregnum periods and related transition 
periods were modified using interpolation.16  
Independent Variables
This study included four independent variables: internal security, economic 
income, industrialization, and diffusion of norms.  Additionally, six control variables 
were included to account for alternative explanations of polity change.  A summary of all 
of the variables and data sources can be found in Table 1 at the end of the section.
Internal Security
As a proxy measure for internal security, this study used intrastate violence data 
from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Database and the Center for Systemic 
Peace’s Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset.17  The PITF and MEPV 
datasets used slightly different coding criteria and therefore have slightly different event 
data.  Both datasets include fatalities as only one of a number of factors that affects a 
society at war.  The primary MEPV metric for the magnitude of total civil violence in a 
country, CIVTOT, is built on a zero to ten scale based on an assessment of the conflict’s 
affect upon human resources (e.g. deaths), population dislocation, social networks, 
environmental quality, infrastructure damage, and quality of life.  PITF coded intrastate 
violence into three categories: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, and genocides / 
politicides.  The datasets for revolutionary and ethnic wars both use the AVEMAG 
16 Thomas  Plumper and Eric Neumayer, "The Level of Democracy During Interregnum and Affected 
Transition Periods: Recoding the Polity2 Score."
17 Monty Marshall, Ted Gurr, and Barbara Harff, "Political Instability Task Force State Failure Problem 
Set, 1955-2006," (Center of Systemic Peace); Monty Marshall, "Major Episodes of Political Violence 
(Mpev), 1946-2004," (Center for Systemic Peace); Meredith Sarkees, "The Correlates of War Data on War: 
An Update to 1997," (Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2000).  The Correlates of War dataset was 
used to confirm the timeframes of event data in the PITF and MEPV datasets.
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variable which is the average magnitude based on three composite scores: the number of 
insurgents, the number of causalities, and the portion of the country affected.  Each of the 
three components is measured on a zero to four point scale.18  For genocides and 
politicides, PITF’s DEATHMAG is a measure of the magnitude of the number of deaths 
on a zero to five point scale.
Unfortunately, there is no single ideal dataset for intrastate violence.  MEPV is 
more inclusive while PITF more accurately captures nuanced changes in the level of 
violence.  For instance, the MEPV dataset captures the student revolts and general strike 
in 1968 France while PITF does not.  On the other hand, MEPV uses only a single 
magnitude for the duration of a conflict while PITF captures annual variations in intensity 
of a conflict.  In order to capture the best of both datasets, a combined variable (Intrastate 
Violence) was generated.  The Intrastate Violence variable was the sum of PITF’s 
AVEMAG for revolution, PITF’s AVEMAG for ethnic war, PITF’s DEATHMAG, and 
MEPV’s CIVTOT; creating a scale of zero to 23.    
Economic Income, Industrialization, and the Diffusion of Norms
Following Lipset,19 as a proxy for the level of industrialization, the study used 
agricultural labor as a percentage of the total labor force as measured by the UN Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO).  To make the econometric results easier to interpret, 
the study used a zero to 100 scale instead of 0% to 100%.  For economic income, the 
research used Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita from the Penn World Tables.20 
Following a standard practice in the field, this study used the log base ten of GDP per 
capita in order to reduce the effect of skewness and extreme outliers upon the results.21 
As a proxy for diffusion of norms, the study used peer countries’ levels of democracy; the 
sum of polity scores for all other countries in the region for that year.  Although norms 
18 In addition, two missing numbers for Pakistan (1997-98) were extrapolated from existing data in the 
PITF Ethnic Wars dataset.  
19 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American Political Science Review 
(1959).
20 Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, "Penn World Table Version 6.2," (Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 2006).
21 Jason W. Osborne, "Best Practices in Data Transformation: The Overlooked Effect of Minimum Values," 
in Best Practices in Quantitative Methods, ed. Jason W. Osborne (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008), 
197-204; Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History 
Analysis," The American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 886. 
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are diffused in a variety of different methods, peer region was selected as the proxy due 
to studies linking democratic diffusion to geographic proximity regardless of the method 
of diffusion.22    
Several alternative variables for diffusion were considered interesting but 
unsuitable including number of memberships in international organizations, number of 
social interactions, and number of economic interactions.  Membership in international 
organizations does not equate to more frequent or significant interactions.  Unstable 
Afghanistan is involved in 42 organizations, the same number as highly democratic 
Botswana.  Highly democratic Albania has only 47 memberships while Algeria has 59. 
In a more extreme case, the special status of Taiwan limits it to 9 international 
memberships.  
Although social, economic and military interactions are also considered 
important, data for interactions based upon foreign travel, military exchanges, and NGO 
activities is limited.  While data for trade, migration, and remittances are more plentiful, 
they are not currently designed for panel data analysis.  Although data for access to 
information technology is readily available for certain timeframes, technology has the 
least theoretical backing as a method of diffusion.  Technology increases the opportunity 
to interact with citizens of a democracy, but in many cases this potential interaction is 
limited.  States can control the information distributed through print, television, and radio 
media.  While cell phones and the internet are less easily controlled by the government, 
both inventions are relatively new, especially in developing countries.  
Control Variables
This study employed six control variables.  Each of these variables had been 
claimed to be a significant influence upon democracy.  In most cases, the causal 
explanation of these variables is dated and has long been disproven.  In other cases, these 
22 Steven  Levitsky and Lucan Way, "International Linkages and Democratization," Journal of Democracy 
16, no. 3 (2005): 22-3; Kristian Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, "Diffusion and the International Context 
of Democratization," International Organization 60(2006): 932-5; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, All  
International Politics Is Local : The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2002), 21-3; Harvey Starr and Christina  Lindborg, "Democratic Dominoes 
Revisited: The Hazards of Governmental Transitions, 1974-1996," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, 
no. 4 (2003): 510-5; Michael Colaresi and William Thompson, "The Economic Development-
Democratization Relationship: Does the Outside World Matter?," Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 4 
(2003): 394-7.
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factors act as catalysts for polity change without influencing the subsequent type of 
polity.  However, some of these control variables may hold some explanatory value.
Research suggests that economic crisis motivates regime change, but has no 
preference over the resulting regime type.23  Following Gasiorowski, the study used a 
combination of GDP loss and inflation as a measure of economic crisis.24  GDP growth 
data was obtained from the Penn World Tables while inflation rate data was gathered 
from the IMF.  The data was used to create a dummy variable for economic crisis.  A 
score of one was given for those country-years that had a greater than eight percent loss 
in annual GDP growth, had a cumulative loss of twenty percent in GDP growth over five 
years, had inflation rates greater than 100%, or suffered a major currency crisis.  A score 
of zero was given to those country-years in which no economic crisis occurred.  For 
major currency crises, 1994 Mexico, 1998 Russia, and 1999 Argentina were coded as 
economic crises.  The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis did not required additional coding 
since countries most affected already had significant GDP loss.  In all, 717 economic 
crises were coded.  
Oil dependence is often cast as an obstacle to democracy since it provides a ready 
source of easily exploitable revenue that an autocratic regime can use to create and 
maintain a patronage network.25  As the major provided of resources, key actors have a 
stake in maintaining the autocratic system.  This is one potential explanation for why the 
countries with the highest oil rents are staunch autocracies.  However, the high oil rent 
states are also located in regions with few democracies.  Despite their high income, they 
lack the industrialization and diffusion of norms that might otherwise encourage 
23 Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Politics of Economic Adjustment : International  
Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); 
Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis."
24 Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis."
25 Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," Comparative Politics 20 no. 1 (1987); 
Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, The Rentier State, Nation, State, and Integration in the Arab World 
V. 2 (London ; New York: Croom Helm, 1987); Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf : Rulers and 
Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, Cambridge Middle East Library 24 (Cambridge England ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth : Economies and 
Institutions in the Middle East, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1997); Jay Ulfelder, "Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy," Comparative Political  
Studies 40, no. 8 (2007); Michael Ross, "Oil and Democracy Revisited," (UCLA, 2009); Benjamin Smith, 
"Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999," American Journal of Political  
Science 48, no. 2 (2004). 
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democracy in their country.  Recent studies shed some doubt on the causal connection 
between oil and lack of democracy.  Many resource dependent countries in the Western 
Hemisphere and, to a lesser extent, in Africa and Asia increased their level of democracy 
in the last twenty years.26     In order to test and control for oil, data for oil rents per capita 
was used.27
The outcome of interstate wars affects regime change.28  Severe physical or 
economic costs during war decrease the perception of the state’s ability to maintain 
security and economic development and lead to a change in government.  However, this 
factor does not necessarily affect the type of new regime created.  In order to control for 
the effect of interstate wars upon regime change, a dummy variable for war loss was 
created based upon data from the Correlates of War.29  Since the dataset ended in 1991, 
five sets of loss of interstate wars were coded: Armenia to Azerbaijan (1991-4), Egypt to 
Britain (1951-2), USSR to Afghanistan (1980-88), and Yugoslavia to NATO (1995 and 
1999).  Including these additions, the dataset contains 88 instances of war loss.
Three enduring structural variables were controlled for: colonial legacy, state age, 
and state region.  Each country was given a code for its colonial legacy or lack thereof 
based on the colonial power that had occupied the country.  In those cases in which a 
country was affected by more than one colonial power for a substantial period, the 
country was given a colonial legacy code of “mixed.”  State age was calculated based on 
the year of independence from the Correlates of War 2: Colonial / Dependency 
Contiguity Dataset.  In order to minimize skew caused by centuries-old countries, state 
age was right-censored at 100 years.  Regions were drawn from the MEPV dataset.  In 
those cases where countries bordered two regions, a single region was chosen based upon 
analytical judgment. For example, the MEPV region code for South America is eight 
while the region code for Central America is nine.  Since Panama connects the two 
regions, MEPV coded Panama as 89.  For the study, Panama was recoded as a nine for 
Central America. 
26 See Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?  A Reappraisal 
of the Resource Curse," (2009).
27 Michael Ross, "Oil, Gas, and Minerals Stata Dataset," (2009).
28 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A 
Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," The American Political Science Review 
89, no. 4 (1995): 850-1.
29 Sarkees, "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997."
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*DV=Dependent Variable; IV=Independent Variable; CV=Control Variable
Table 1: Summary of Data Sources
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 provide the minimum, maximum and mean 
values, standard deviation, and number of observations of each variable.  Descriptive 
statistics are included for each variable as described in its original format as well as the 
first differenced variable in its modified form.  
Variable Min Max Mean SD Count
Polity2 -10 10 0.06 7.55 7898
deltaPolity100 -90 80 0.3 8.52 7561
Intrastate Violence 0 20 1.04 2.71 8005
deltaiv -14 14.5 0.004 1.08 7669
Ag Labor 0 0.95 0.45 0.29 6144
deltaAgLab100 -3 1 -0.54 0.59 5976
GDP 40 84408 6653 7675 6164
deltalog10GDP -1.87 0.4 0.007 0.04 5998
deltapeerregionpolity -27 133 2.89 12.12 7561
Oil Rents 0 63089 832 3665 3705
Deltaoil -18242 38125 11.6 1110 7369
Maturity 0 100 56.50 37.50 8002
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics by Variable
12
Variables Metric Type* Metric Source Years
Level of 
Democracy
Polity2 DV Polity IV 1800-2007
Economic 
Income
GDP per capita IV Penn World Tables (PWT) 1950-2006
Economic 
Development
Percent of Labor 
in Agriculture
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Methodology
The first step in the methodology section is a brief presentation of a mathematical 
representation of the hypothetical effect that the independent variables have upon the 
dependent variable.  From this model, data analysis identified the optimal regression 
model.  This section ends with a summary of the computational approach.
Mathematical Model
Based upon the literature discussed previously, four hypotheses were identified. 
Using the proxy variables described in the previous section, the polity of country i at time 
t is expressed in four separate mathematical models, one for each hypothesis:
Pit = β(Intrastate Violenceit)  + Uit (Error)
Pit = β (Ag Laborit) + Uit (Error)
Pit = β LN(GDPit) + Uit (Error)
Pit = β (Diffusionit) + Uit (Error)
However, this study does not assume that the independent variables act in isolation of one 
another.  On the contrary, there are a variety of interconnections.  Therefore, this paper 
expresses polity, P, as:
P = f(A, Y, V, D, Z)
Polity is a function of five factors where A is the level of industrialization, Y is economic 
income, V is security, and D is the diffusion of norms.  The Z term is a vector of control 
variables which is defined as:
Z  = g(C, O, L, R, M,W )
The culmination of the control variables is made up of six factors where C equals 
economic crisis, O equals oil rents, L equals colonial legacy, R equals the region, M 
equals bureaucratic maturity, and W equals loss of an interstate war. Combining the four 
hypotheses and the control variables into a single, testable form, the mathematical model 
can be expressed as:
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Pit = β (Intrastate Violenceit) + β (Ag Laborit) + β (Diffusionit) + β LN(GDPit)
+ β (econ_crisisit) + β (oilit) + β (legacyit) + β (regionit) + β (maturityit)
+ β (war lossit) + Uit (Error)
The Greek character β, beta, represents the standard coefficient for each variable. 
Since the value of the dependent and independent variables are provided from the dataset, 
the regression analysis solves for the error and the coefficient for each independent 
variable.  It is the comparison of these standardized coefficients that explains the 
significance of each independent variable relative to the others as an explanatory cause of 
the dependent variable.  However, prior to calculating the coefficients, it is important to 
first conduct some routine tests upon the dataset in order to select the optimum regression 
model to maximize the accuracy of the results.   
Identifying the Optimal Regression Model
There are five standard tests that assist in the identification of an optimum 
regression model or models: unit root, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, endogeneity, 
and fixed versus random effects.  Conducting regression analysis without these tests runs 
the risk of choosing the wrong method of regression or underestimating the error in the 
results.  These tests work to minimize spurious correlations so that the results indicate a 
causal relationship to the extent possible.
When analyzing data over time, some variables have a natural trend (positive or 
negative) over time.  For instance, country rates of access to cell phones over the past 
twenty years are on a growth trajectory as technology evolved and prices dropped. 
Although the growth rate changes from year to year, the growth rates are nearly all 
positive.  These long term trends, called trend stationary variables, must be accounted for 
in order to reduce bias in the results.  In order to test for trend stationarity, each variable 
of interest was tested using the Fisher augmented Dickey Fuller Test (xtfisher in Stata); a 
test compatible with unbalanced panels.  The test indicated trend stationary results for 
polity, GDP per capita, and peer region polity.30  In order to account for the positive trend 
in these three variables over time, the study used the first differenced variables (i.e. 
30 The study was unable to reject the null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationarity)
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annual change).  Using the Fisher Test upon the first differenced variables, the test 
indicated no trend stationarity.31
When analyzing data over time, there is also a possibility that the observations of 
some variables behave in a repeated pattern.  This condition, known as serial correlation, 
if present, adversely affects the parameter estimates and must be corrected.  This study 
used the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data models (xtserial in Stata) to test 
for serial correlation.  Using the first differenced data, the test indicated that serial 
correlation was present.32  Due to this finding, the study must avoid Ordinary Least 
Squares based estimators because they will underestimate the standard errors.
With an unbalanced panel over 60 years, heteroskedasticity (significant 
differences in variance over time) was likely to be present.  This was expected because 
not all 162 countries are represented for the entire timeframe largely due to the dramatic 
increase in the number of countries during post World War II decolonization.  Only 72 
countries were part of the dataset for 1946.  This number climbs to 112 by 1961 and 158 
by 1991.  In some cases, there is country attrition such as when West Germany and East 
Germany merged into a single Germany.  Due to these variations in the size of 
observations, the study expected to find variance in the error term over time.  This study 
used the Modified Wald Test for Group-wise Heteroskedasticity (xtreg followed by 
xttest3 in Stata).  The test indicated that heteroskedasticity was present.33  Fortunately, the 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator corrects both for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity.
Endogeneity is present if an independent variable is correlated with the error term.
The literature suggests that causality between intrastate violence and level of democracy 
are bi-directional or co-determined.  That is, changes in violence may lead to changes in 
democracy and changes in democracy may lead to changes in the level of violence.  The 
literature also suggests that GDP-violence, GDP-industrialization, diffusion-democracy, 
and GDP-democracy also have bi-directional relationships.  Using the Hausman Test for 
31 The study was able to reject the null hypothesis of unit root.
32 The study was able to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.  
33 The study was able to reject the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity.
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Endogeneity upon the first differenced variables, endogeneity was not found.34 
Therefore, no correction for endogeneity was necessary.
The final pre-test conducted compared the fixed effects versus random effects 
generator.  Fixed effects tend to be more consistent while random effects are more 
efficient.  The Hausman Test (xtreg with fe, then xtreg with re, then hausman fe re in 
Stata) test a null hypothesis to determine if the difference in the coefficients between 
fixed and random effects is not systematic.  The test returned a P-value of 1.83 with 
Prob>chi2 of 0.7665, indicating that random effects should be used. 
Unfortunately, the existing literature provides little insight into the selection of an 
appropriate regression model.35  However, the requirements for GLS, in order to correct 
for serial correlation and heteroskedascity, as well as the recommendation for random 
effects, led to an optimum model selection of the random-effects linear model with first-
order autoregressive disturbance (xtregar in Stata).  The xtregar model is suitable for 
unbalanced panels and provides the option of a GLS estimator with random effects.  
This study tested two model variations.  Model One included all polities.  Since 
the study expected that violence has a non-linear relationship with democracy and cannot 
rule out similar relationships with other independent variables, the polity database was 
bifurcated in order to more accurately understand the causal nature.  Therefore, Model 
Two included those polities that never achieved a polity2 score greater than zero.  This 
model specifically focuses on the lower half of the polity scale in order to differentiate 
the effect of variables across the polity spectrum without the natural bias of the more 
numerous democratic polities.  Both models were tested for the time period 1946-2006. 
In order to test for changes in variable sensitivity over time, Model One was tested for 
five time period subsets: 1961-69, 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99, and 2000-06.  Although 
34 The study was unable to reject the null hypothesis that the regressor is exogenous.  
35 The major econometric studies of the determinants or outcomes of democracy focus almost exclusively 
upon dichotomous variables, a method antithetical to the exploration of democracy as a spectrum of levels. 
For example, Przeworski, et al., Michael Ross, Goldstone, et al., Hegre, et al., Mansfield and Snyder, and 
Russett and Oneal used dichotomous dependent variables.
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the time period subsets substantially reduced the number of observations, the purpose of 
the test was intended to identify changes in variable significance over time.  
Computational Approach
Computational analysis augmented the econometric analysis.  While the 
econometric analysis identified relationships over time, the computational analysis 
focused exclusively on the year of change between polity types.  Although the 
econometric approach is more accurate, the computational approach provides more easily 
interpretable results.  For the computational portion, the study used a modified three-tier 
dependent variable of democracy based upon resulting regime type.  Following Epstein, 
et al., this study coded a polity score of eight or greater as a full democracy, from one to 
seven as a partial democracy, and zero and less as an autocracy.36  The score of eight is 
significant because it requires a maximum score in at least one of the three elements that 
make up polity.  The score of zero was a natural breakpoint for autocracies since it 
indicates a tendency towards autocracy over democracy.  Differentiation between the 
variations in autocracy was beyond the scope of this phase of the research.  Additionally, 
any country that gained its independence during the time period studied was coded as a 
colony for its first transition.  The computational method was used to analyze 277 cases; 
190 of the cases involved an increase in the level of democracy while 87 were a decrease 
in democracy (see Table 3).  
Transition from: Transition to: Number of Cases
Partial Democracy Full Democracy 35
Colony Full Democracy 18
Autocracy Full Democracy 30
Total increase to Full 
Democracy
83
Colony Partial Democracy 27
Autocracy Partial Democracy 80
Total increase to 
Partial Democracy
107
Total increase in 
democracy
190
Full Democracy Partial Democracy 19
Full Democracy Autocracy 14
36 David L. Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions " American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 
(2006).
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Total decrease from 
Full Democracy
33
Partial Democracy Autocracy 54
Total decrease in 
democracy
87
Table 3: Transition Cases by Regime Type
The independent variables analyzed were largely the same as those used for the 
econometric analysis: GDP per capita, economic crisis, bureaucratic maturity, 
agricultural labor, oil rents per capita, war loss, geographic region, and colonial ruler.  In 
addition, four dummy variables were also created to test for constitutional design: 
parliament, proportional representation, bicameral, and federal.  Each category was given 
a score of zero or one.  Hybrid designs were given a score of one half.   Instead of using 
the level of intrastate violence, dummy variables were used to represent the current status 
of violence within the country: increasing violence preceding transition, existence of 
violence during transition, and reduced violence preceding transition.  
Results were calculated for each variable by transition type.  For instance, the 
mean level of agricultural labor was calculated for all transitions from partial democracy 
to full democracy and compared with the seven other types of transition.  Additionally, 
the averages (totals for dummy variables) were aggregated into and compared across 
three categories: transitions to full democracy, transitions away from full democracy, and 
transitions to autocracy.  Note that transitions from colonial rule to autocracy are not 
considered because this study considers colonies to be a type of autocracy.  Finally each 
variable was compared as to the proportion of increases in democracy compared to the 
proportion of decreases in democracy.  For example, war loss corresponded to nine 
increases in democracy (5% of upward transitions) and four decreases in democracy (5% 
of downward transitions).  Although the absolute number might suggest that war loss 
favors transitions to democracy, the lack of difference in proportion indicates that while 
war loss may be a catalyst for political change it neither democracy nor autocracy. 
Finally, one additional hypothesis was tested using the intrastate violence dummy 
variables; all else being equal, the presence of intrastate violence during a transition to a 
higher level of democracy may limit the sustainability of that level of democracy.  This 
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hypothesis was analyzed using a simple comparison of success rates; the proportion of 
long term successes of transitions towards increased democracy during periods of 
violence compared to those same transitions during periods of no reported violence.
Quantitative Results
The results for the quantitative analysis are organized into three sections.  The 
first section reports on the results of the effect of intrastate violence upon democracy. 
The second section presents the results of the various economic-related variables 
including industrialization, income, and the control variables of economic crisis and oil 
rents.  The final section presents the results of the diffusion of norms including the 
change in peer country democracy and the control variables of bureaucratic maturity, 
colonial legacy, region, and the loss of an interstate war.
Intrastate Violence
The study’s first hypothesis posited that a change in the level of intrastate 
violence may lead to a change in the level of democracy.  This section reports the results 
of intrastate violence in three segments; the effect of rising intrastate violence on the level 
of democracy; the effect of decreasing violence; and the long term effect of the presence 
of violence during large increases in democracy.
The regression results support the hypothesis that a change in violence leads to a 
change in democracy.  Model One in Table 4 indicates that there is an inverse 
relationship between changes in the level of intrastate violence and changes in the level 
of democracy.  It is interesting to note that the significance and magnitude are 
considerably less for the smaller sample of observations in Model Two.  This suggests 
that autocracies are less influenced by changes in intrastate violence perhaps due to fewer 





Δ Intrastate Violence -3.59*** -1.06
0.00 0.29
Δ Industrialization 0.53 0.49
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0.60 0.62
Δ Income 1.39 -2.67**
0.17 0.01
Δ Peer Democracy 2.57** 1.87*
0.01 0.06
Note: *p=<.10; **p=<.05; ***p=<.001
Table 4: Linear Regression Results
Rising Violence Causes a Change in Democracy
A change in the level of intrastate violence was a factor in 30% of significant 
regime changes.  A rise in the level of violence could potentially claim responsibility for 
20% (17 or 87) of substantial decreases in democracy in the post-war era.37  However, it 
is important to note that the quantitative results do not differentiate between violence as a 
cause for regime change and violence as a means for regime change.  In some cases, 
violence motivated the executive to consolidate power.  In 2002, in the face of a 
strengthening Maoist insurgency, the King of Nepal disbanded the legislature and 
consolidated power in a vain attempt to improve the country’s governance.  In 1972, 
President Ferdinand Marcos turned the Philippines from a limited democracy into a one-
man dictatorship with the declaration of martial law following the escalating attacks of 
communist insurgents.  In other cases, violence was not the motivation for regime change 
but the means for regime change.  The 1997 civil war in Congo resulted in autocracy 
after the victorious rebels suspended the constitution.  In 1966, the Ugandan government 
began an ethnic civil war in an attempt to consolidate political power.  
While rising violence led to a decrease in democracy in 17 cases, in 22 cases 
significant increases in violence had no effect on the level of democracy.  In fact, 
governments have a surprising resilience to rising violence.  For example, Model Two in 
Table 4 shows that the affect upon autocratic governments, while still negative, was not 
statistically significant.  Full democracies and full autocracies survived periods of 
violence unexpectedly well.  Of 17 cases of increasing violence in full democracies, 65% 
(11 cases) tolerated a period of violence without a significant change in democracy while 
72% of full autocracies persisted.  Prominent examples include India and the United 
Kingdom which maintained their democracy despite prolonged periods of high 
magnitude violence.  Of full democracies, the only two cases that resulted in a transition 
37 A substantial decrease was measured as a transition from a positive to a negative polity2 score.
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from full democracy to autocracy, Turkey and Thailand, had previous histories of 
political instability.  In comparison, only 30% of partial autocracies and 50% of partial 
democracies endured a period of increased violence without a change (either positive or 
negative) in the level of democracy.  
Although an increase in violence is more likely to cause a reduction in 
democracy, 11% (21 of 190) of large increases in the level of democracy were associated 
with increasing violence.  For instance, civil disturbances in 1968 were partially 
responsible for France’s return to full democracy.  At the end of the Cold War, after 
violent clashes between protestors and the army, the Romanian military ousted President 
Ceauşescu, the communist dictator.     
Decreasing Violence
During data analysis, an interesting pattern appeared in which several countries 
became democracies immediately upon the cessation of internal violence.  The regression 
analysis supports the premise that a decrease in violence could lead to an increase in 
democracy.  In 68 cases of countries that demonstrated a decreasing trend in the level of 
violence, 53% resulted in an increase of democracy.  The end of violence was arguably a 
key to democratization in 1969 Venezuela, 1996 Guatemala, and 2004 Algeria.  Yet, it is 
not a green flag for all states.  Decreasing violence appeared to have no immediate effect 
on 1996 Croatia or 1994 Indonesia, two states that were poised for democratic transitions. 
Surprisingly, 13% of the cases responded to a reduction in violence by decreasing their 
level of democracy.  Greece, for example, transitioned to autocracy in 1949 after the 
Greek Civil War came to an end.  
This suggests that intrastate violence has varying effects on the level of 
democracy depending upon the initial level of democracy.  Trend analysis lends 
additional evidence to this interpretation.  Based upon the average level of intrastate 
violence by polity type, full democracies are by far the least violent regime type (see 
Figure 1).  Prior to 1980, the majority of violence was within the partially autocratic 
regimes.  High levels of violence in partial democracies are limited to the 1980s.  By the 
1990s, fully autocratic regimes had actually become more violent than the partial 
democracies.  This suggests that Hegre’s findings of an inverted U-curve relationship 
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between violence and democracy is an oversimplification.38  While the relationship holds 
true for the 1980s and 1990s, remaining time periods suggest a lack of symmetry with the 
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Figure 1: Violence Trends across Regime Types
Of course, there are cases of intrastate violence within even full democracies. 
Among countries with high levels of democracy, states with intrastate violence 
consistently had lower democracy scores on average than states without any violence (see 
Figure 2).  Examples of full democracies with periods of intrastate violence include 
Columbia, Israel, Italy, and the United Kingdom.  Countries that were autocratic during 
periods of violence such as Bangladesh, Guatemala, Honduras, and Indonesia actually 
averaged higher levels of democracy than autocracies without violence (see Figure 3). 
Therefore, the effect of reduced levels of intrastate violence depends upon the initial 
regime type.  Intrastate violence tends to pull regimes towards the center of the polity 
spectrum.  
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Figure 3: Effect of Violence on Polity Scores in Autocracies
Because intrastate violence pulls governments towards the center of the polity 
spectrum, countries that substantially increase democracy during a period of violence 
have a low probability of maintaining a high level democracy.  Of 35 cases, 65% of 
regimes that transitioned during a period of intrastate violence failed while an additional 
10% suffered a significant decrease in democracy.  Azerbaijan, Burma, Guatemala, and 
Sierra Leone each have examples of failed attempts to democratize during periods of 
insurgency.  Those states that did survive tended to have low levels of violence and did 
not achieve high levels of democracy until the violence was reduced to insignificant 
levels.  Violent transitions in 1957 Columbia, 1986 Guatemala, and 1993 Peru led to 
partial democracies.  Full democracy was achieved, but only after the violence dissipated. 
There are three notable exceptions: Philippines, Indonesia, and South Africa.  All three of 
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these countries transitioned during periods of significant violence and obtained high 
levels of democracy.  In the cases of Indonesia and South Africa, a small reduction in, but 
not elimination of, violence preceded the development of full democracy.  
The Economy
Analysis on the economic effects upon democracy is discussed in three sections: 
industrialization, income, and the economic control variables
Industrialization
Hypothesis Two stated that changes in the level industrialization may lead to 
changes in the level of democracy.  The regression results in Table 4 and Table 6 indicate 
that the relationship between changes in industrialization and level of democracy are not 
statistically significant.  However, this does not mean that the factor is irrelevant.  A 
cursory look at the data suggests a linear relationship between industrialization and 
changes in democracy.  Transitions to full democracy averaged 12 points less in 
agricultural labor than transitions to partial democracies (Figure 4).  The point spread 
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Figure 4: Agricultural Labor and Regime Change
Countries with higher levels of agriculture are more likely to breakdown.  Further, 
their reductions in democracy are likely to be more severe.  The average case of a full 
democracy transitioning to a partial democracy had an agricultural labor rate of 47%. 
Full democracies that transition to autocracy had an average agricultural labor rate of 
63%.  
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Surprisingly, regression analysis separated by time periods (Table 5), indicates a 
positive relationship between low industrialization and democracy in the 2000s.  During 
this period, numerous countries with low levels of industrialization had substantial 
increases in democracy including Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Senegal, Burundi, East Timor, 
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, and Nepal.  Of course, because all nine cases are new democracies, 
it is too soon to conclude that industrialization is no longer a prerequisite for the 
sustainment of democracy.
Model One
1946+ 1961-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000+
Δ Intrastate 
Violence -3.59*** -2.85** -2.83** -1.000 -0.320 -2.85**
0.000 0.004 0.005 0.320 0.751 0.004
Δ Industrialization 0.530 0.040 -0.380 0.000 0.200 2.11**
0.596 0.968 0.702 0.998 0.840 0.035
Δ Income 1.390 1.540 -0.600 1.140 1.040 1.640
0.166 0.125 0.548 0.158 0.299 0.101
Δ Peer Democracy 2.57** -1.67* 0.650 1.94* 1.170 1.420
0.010 0.094 0.513 0.052 0.240 0.157
Table 5: Variance in Explanatory Power over Time
The distribution of agricultural labor in polities is in the shape of an inverted U-
curve (see Figure 5).  The comparison between the two figures suggests that the shape of 
the curve has become more pronounced over time.  Instead of being fully autocratic, non-
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Figure 5: Agricultural Labor and Regime Type over time
Left chart shows average from 1961-2004; right chart shows 2006
Although industrialization does not cause increased democracy, the data indicate 
that a high level of industrialization is conducive to achieving and maintaining a high 
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level of democracy.  Throughout much of the twentieth century, industrialization was a 
necessary, but not sufficient, factor for an increase in democracy.  However, the recent 
trend in low-industrialized countries becoming increasingly democratic suggests that 
industrialization may no longer be a necessary cause of democracy.  
Income
Hypothesis Three asserts that a change in the level of income may lead to a 
change in the level of democracy.  When the control variables were taken into account, 
income was shown to have a positive effect on the level of democracy (see Table 6). 
However, the results for Model Two suggest that income is not a determining variable in 
level of democracy across the entire polity spectrum as GDP growth has a negative effect 
on the level of democracy within partially autocratic systems.  Instead of pushing 
countries towards democracy, GDP appears to push countries towards the polity 






Δ Intrastate Violence -3.53*** -0.90
0.00 0.37
Δ Industrialization 0.97 0.54
0.33 0.59
Δ Income 1.75* -2.25**
0.08 0.02
Δ Peer Democracy 2.40** 1.54
0.02 0.12
Economic Crisis 1.07(0.284) -0.26(0.793)
Δ Oil Rent -0.24(0.812) 0.44(0.657)
Bureaucratic Maturity 2.25**(0.024) 2.30**(0.021)
Interstate War Loss 0.49(0.621) -0.67(0.506)
West Africa 1.36(0.175) 1.49(0.135)
North Africa 0.90(0.366) 0.91(0.360)
East Africa 0.60(0.550) 1.43(0.153)
South Africa 0.99(0.324) 0.09(0.930)
Mid East 0.67(0.502) 1.33(0.183)
South Asia 0.49(0.627) 0.26(0.796)
East Asia 0.43(0.668) 0.37(0.709)
South America 0.45(0.653) NA
Central America 0.89(0.375) NA
Isolated Islands 0.38(0.710) NA
Belgian Colony 0.85(0.397) NA
Dutch Colony 0.89(0.371) NA
French Colony 0.37(0.712) 1.33(0.257)
Ottoman Colony 0.64(0.525) -0.29(0.769)
Portuguese Colony 0.24(0.814) -0.84(0.403)
Russian Colony 0.27(0.786) 1.60(0.110)
Spanish Colony -0.33(0.744) NA
British Colony -0.53(0.599) 0.55(0.582)
Mixed Colony 0.22(0.827) 0.54(0.588)
Japanese Colony 0.82(0.415) 1.10(0.271)
Table 6: Regression Results with Control Variables
Part of the reason that the regression returned such unimpressive results for the 
impact of income on democracy is the changing nature of the relationship over time. 
Table 5 suggests that income had a negative effect on democracy during the 1970s.
The variation over time and across polity type is more easily seen in Table 7 below.  
Throughout the post-war period, countries transitioning to full democracy had twice the 
average GDP of those countries that transitioned to autocracy.  However, this gap 
narrowed during the 1970s as relatively wealthy countries such as Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay moved towards autocracy.  The income gap almost entirely disappeared in the 
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2000s as moderately wealthy countries such as Iran, Fiji, and Thailand drastically 
reduced their levels of democracy.
Average GDP Per Capita (in thousands)
1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Transition to 
Full Democracy




1.7 3.0 1.5 2.7 4.1 3.5 2.1
Regression from 
Full Democracy
NM NM 1.3 2.2 4.3 3.2 NM
Transition to 
Autocracy
1.8 1.3 2.3 3.1 1.9 2.6 3.4
NM – due to low occurrences during this period, the average is not meaningful
Table 7: The GDP-democracy relationship over time
Clearly, income is a discriminator between transitions to full democracy versus 
partial democracy.  Income also was a discriminator in determining regression from full 
democracy.  With the exception of the 1950s, full democratizers averaged higher GDPs 
than any other type of regime transition while partial democratizers had the lowest 
average GDP.  Countries that regressed from full democracy consistently had lower 
GDPs than those achieving full democracy.  Surprisingly, transitions to autocracy often 
had a higher average GDP than transitions to partial democracy.  In general, the 























-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Polity Score
GDP and Polity Score
Income Level and Regime Type
28
Figure 6: Income Level and Regime Type
A linear relationship between income change and level of democracy appears to 
be limited to the 1980s and 1990s.  During this period, GDP in cases transitioning to full 
democracy was almost three times that of transitions to autocracy.  Even the partial 
democracies demonstrated a clear economic advantage over the autocracies.  With the 
exception of Argentina, all autocratizers in the 1980s were relatively poor countries.  In 
the 1990s, as countries became independent from the Soviet Union, new countries that 
became full democracies had almost 80 percent more GDP per capita than those that 
became partial democracies.  
It is not unheard of for a poor country to attain a high level of democracy.  During 
the period of study, there were 26 cases of a country with less than $2,000 GDP per 
capita attaining full democracy.  However, only three of those cases managed to survive 
over the long term: India, Mongolia, and the Solomon Islands.  Four more recent cases, 
Ghana, Liberia, Moldova, and Senegal, also achieved a high level of democracy but have 
not yet withstood the test of time.
Like industrialization, income does not cause an increase in democracy though a 
high level of income is conducive to achieving and maintaining a high level of 
democracy.  The recent trend of low income countries becoming increasingly democratic 
suggests that income’s relevance to the level of democracy may be on the wane.  
Economic Control Variables
The regression results in Table 6 showed that the two economic control variables, 
economic crisis and oil rents, had no statistically significant effect on the level of 
democracy.  Economic crisis as a primary catalyst for regime change is a recent 
development.  Since World War II, the first correlation between economic crisis and 
regime change was Nigeria’s fragile democracy in 1966.  In the 1970s, a handful of 
countries increased democracy, though temporarily, after an economic crisis.  The 
collapse of cocoa prices, Ghana’s primary trade commodity, led to the downfall of the 
autocratic regime and the birth of Ghana’s first, though short-lived, partially democratic 
regime.  Bangladesh and Nigeria went through similar experiences.  In the 1980s, 
regional economic crises in Latin America sparked widespread democratization.  Three 
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of these transitions, Brazil, Bolivia and Uruguay, achieved long-lasting, high levels of 
democracy.  But, economic crisis was responsible for its share of autocratizations.  Triple 
digit inflation correlated with democratic breakdowns in Ghana, Turkey, and Uganda. 
Overall, economic crisis as a catalyst for regime change slightly favored increases in 
democracy.  In cases where polity change was associated with an economic crisis, 73% of 
the cases resulted in a significant increase in the level of democracy.  However, the 
importance of economic crisis as a catalyst for polity change is largely constrained to the 
1980s and 1990s which accounted for 80% of the cases. 
The explanatory power of oil as an obstacle to democracy appears to have lost its 
luster during the early 1990s.  Although no country has ever transitioned to democracy 
while it received more than $1,000 in annual oil rents per capita, the majority of oil-rich 
autocracies are in regions rife with oil-poor autocracies.  Outside of the Middle East and 
developed countries, countries with significant amounts of oil (oil rents greater than 150 
per capita) lagged in levels of democracy for significant periods prior to the 1990s (see 
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Figure 7: Effect of Oil on Level of Democracy in Developing Countries
While full autocracies such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE dominate oil 
production business, the oil production in other autocracies is not substantially greater 
than in the democracies (see Figure 8).  Only in a few cases can a decrease in the level of 
democracy be attributed to a rise in oil rents: Indonesia, Syria, and Gabon.39   A decrease 
39 Haber and Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?  A Reappraisal of the Resource 
Curse," 19-22.
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in oil rents contributed indirectly to a delayed increase in Mexico’s democracy.  On the 
other hand, an increase in oil rents during 1979-1980 corresponded to large increases in 
democracy in Ecuador, Nigeria, and Peru.  Finally, Algeria, Nigeria, and Venezuela had 
increases in the level of democracy despite high levels of oil rents.  Oil does not appear to 
be a determinative factor in the level of democracy.  However, oil can be used to extend a 
patronage system which encourages the sustainment of autocratic processes.  Therefore, 
it is not the presence of oil that is detrimental to democracy, but the capabilities and 
preferences of key actors in the decision to establish a patronage system using the readily 
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Figure 8: Oil Rents and Regime Type
Diffusion of Norms
The fourth hypothesis contends that a change in the level of the diffusion of 
norms may lead to a change in the level of democracy.  This hypothesis was tested using 
a proxy of change in the level of democracy for all other countries in the region.  In 
addition, this section discusses the results of several normative control variables that were 
used including state maturity, colonial legacy, region, and loss of an interstate war.
Changes in Peer Countries’ Level of Democracy
The regression results of Model One in Table 6 showed that the regional 
diffusion of democratic norms was a significant factor in increasing levels of democracy. 
Interestingly, the results for Model Two suggest that peer country democracy has far less 
influence upon autocratic countries.  Table 5 suggests that the peer influence of 
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neighboring countries had a limited effect prior to the 1980s.  There are likely multiple 
reasons for this temporal variation on regional influence.  First, the end of the Cold War 
removed ideological restrictions to the adoption of democratic ideals.  Second, this period 
saw a dramatic rise in the ability to share democratic ideals across borders due to the 
introduction of cell phones, the internet, and the increasing proliferation of radio.  Third, 
declining transportation costs and increasing economic liberalization provided increased 
social and economic interaction with neighbor countries.  
Normative Control Variables
The regression results in Table 6 indicate that the maturity of the state had a 
significant positive effect on the level of democracy across all polity types, including 
autocracies.  Analyzing countries that have had regime change since World War II, the 
pattern continues to hold.  As Table 8 shows, transitions to full democracy are the most 
mature while transitions to autocracy are the least mature.  Of course, time itself is not the 
explanatory variable.  Several young states achieved high levels of democracy soon after 
independence such as India, Jamaica, Papua New Guinea, and Trinidad.  Similarly, old 
states such as China, Iran, and Oman continue to have low levels of democracy.
Type of Regime Change
Years since Independence 
(excluding colonial transfers)
Achieved Full Democracy 70
Transition resulting in Partial Democracy 59
Regression from Full Democracy to Partial 
Democracy
63
Transition to Autocracy 45
Table 8: Regime Change and Average Maturity
Although the majority of substantial increases in democracy since World War II 
occurred in British colonies (see Table 9), the British colonies also have more than their 
share of transitions to autocracy in countries like Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Uganda, and 
Zimbabwe. Over the long term, the ratio of democratization to autocratization in British 
colonies was no better than the Spanish or French.  Although the Russian and Turkish 
colonies had surprisingly high democratization rates among a small number of cases, no 
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colonial power had a statistically significant long term effect on the level of democracy 
across their colonies (see Table 6).
None UK ESP FRA Otto NL US RU JP Port GER Belg IT
Democ 17% 29% 18% 15% 6% 4% 1% 6% 2% 3% 2% 1% 1%
Autoc 17% 38% 23% 16% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 0% 2% 1%
Ratio 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.7 1.1 0.2 1.8 0.9 1.1 N/A 0.5 0.5
Table 9: Regime Change and Colonial Legacy40
Table 6 also shows no statistically significant relationship between region and 
level of democracy.  While some regions have more democracy than others, every region 
has some democracy present.  OECD, Central and South America have especially good 
records with democracy.  However, Latin American democracy only began its 
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Figure 9: Latin America Democracy Trend
Upward trends in the level of democracy in Asia and Africa beginning in 1980 
and 1990, respectively, suggest either that region is not a significant determining factor or 
that its influence has waned over time (Figure 10).  Surprisingly, Southwest Asia has 
surpassed South Asia in both number of democracies and average polity score.  However, 
this democracy advantage is largely driven by states on the outskirts of the region: 
Armenia, Cyprus, Georgia, Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey.  But, there were significant 
40 United Kingdom, Spain, France, Ottoman, Netherlands, United States, Russia, Japan, Portugal, Germany, 
Belgium, and Italy
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political liberalizations in Bahrain, Iran, Jordan and Yemen.  It is interesting to note that 
the African regions have higher averages of democracy than Southwest and South Asia. 
Africa (Figure 11).  Even in highly autocratic North Africa, polity scores have increased 
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Figure 10: Asian Democracy Trends Figure 11: African Democracy Trends41
Besides above average successes in South Africa and Central America, most 
developing regions had a similar ratio of democratization to autocratization (Table 10). 
From these results, it is difficult to argue that a specific region, for example the Middle 



















Democ 17% 13% 1% 6% 7% 6% 8% 13% 14% 9%
Autoc 7% 17% 1% 8% 6% 8% 10% 14% 18% 7%
Ratio 2.5 0.8 0.9 0.7 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.4
Table 10: Regime Change and Region
The loss of an interstate war had no significant impact on the level of democracy 
(Table 6).  Of 25 war losses since 1946, about half resulted in significant regime change. 
Perhaps one of the most famous examples is the collapse of Argentina’s military regime 
after its defeat in the Falklands War.  A more recent example is Serbia’s conversion to 
democracy after its defeat in the Kosovo Conflict at the hands of NATO.  While the loss 
of war acts as a catalyst for a change in the level of democracy, it has no affect on the 
41 Note that the trend prior to 1965 is distorted due to the low number of independent countries.
42 Excluding Japan, Australia, Mexico, and New Zealand.
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direction of that change.  For example, defeat in war was also a catalyst for breakdown of 
democracy in Azerbaijan and Syria.  
Summary
These findings can inform policy in a number of ways.  There is no single 
structural factor that will produce democracy.  However, a country’s level of security, 
income, industrialization, and diffusion should be considered prior to policy attempts to 
influence a change in the level of democracy.  Almost all of the factors reviewed have 
some type of influence on the level of democracy (see Table 11).  However, the 
relationships varied over time in part due to changes in actor preferences.  Despite this 
fact, several conclusions can be reached regarding the general, though not directly causal, 
relationship between structural factors and the level of democracy.
Hypothesis Finding
 Security  Δ Democracy Although not determinative alone, security is 
positively related to democracy.
 Development  Δ Democracy Development does not induce democracy.  Assists 
in achieving and maintaining a high level of 
democracy, but relevance is waning over time.
 Income  Δ Democracy Curvilinear relationship; income pushes democracy 
towards the extremes.   
 Diffusion  Δ Democracy Positive effect overall, though more limited on 
autocracies; most influential in 1980s and following
Table 11 Summary of Hypotheses Results
Increases in security, income, and diffusion alone may lead to an increase in the 
level of democracy.  Concomitantly, decreasing levels of security, income, and diffusion 
may lead to a decreased level of democracy.  However, the relationship is not linear. 
Intrastate violence, poverty, and under-development appear to have a centripetal effect 
upon regimes, pulling them towards the middle of the polity spectrum.  Actors are more 
likely to adopt high levels of democracy if there are high levels of security, income, 
industrialization, and diffusion of norms.  Of the four categories, the most important are 
security and diffusion of norms.  Countries with high levels of violence and low levels of 
democracy in neighboring countries are unlikely to achieve and sustain a high level of 
democracy.  Although it is possible to overcome this obstacles, policy makers 
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encouraging democracy in such countries should work to mitigate the violence while 
creating a conduit for the diffusion of democratic ideals.
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